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This concluding article derives six major findings from the contributions to this special issue. First, the
barriers and challenges to decarbonisation vary significantly across sectoral systems. Second, and simi-
larly, the need and potential for the five functions of international governance institutions to contribute
to effective climate protection also vary widely. Third, while the pattern is uneven, there is a general
undersupply of international climate governance. Fourth, the sectoral analyses confirm that the UNFCCC
and Paris Agreement play an important overarching role but remain limited in advancing effective
sectoral governance. Fifth, while non-environmental institutions may present important barriers to
decarbonisation, more synergistic effects are possible. Sixth, our sectoral approach provides a sound
basis on which to identify sector-specific policy options. The paper then offers reflections on the merits
and limitations of the sectoral approach, before identifying avenues for future research to further
advance the agenda.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The increasingly polycentric landscape of international climate
governance can appear rather amorphous, presenting challenges to
those assessing its overall effects. While the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris
Agreement still play a central role, the governance landscape has
grown much more diverse, featuring a greater number of interna-
tional institutions, including transnational ones that comprise
subnational and non-state actors. The complex shape of this land-
scape makes assessments of its adequacy, i.e. to what extent the
potential for effective international governance is being exploited,
difficult. First attempts to assess its structure have been made (see
inter alia Widerberg et al., 2016; van Asselt 2014) and individual
contributions have subdivided specific institutional complexes into
various subgroups according to particular sub-fields or governancer), sebastian.oberthuer@vub.
. Hermwille).
r B.V. This is an open access article
ür and L. Hermwille, A sector
e, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esfunctions (Oberthür and Po _zarowska 2013; Orsini et al. 2013). Yet
the interplay between the growing number of intergovernmental
and transnational institutions of climate governance e the syn-
ergies but also potential conflicts e has yet to be studied in a sys-
tematic way (Betsill et al., 2015).
To this end, this special issue proposes a focus on sectoral sys-
tems as ameans for amore systematic distinction and structuring of
our understanding of polycentric global climate governance. It
specifically investigates the potential and actual contribution of
global governance to facilitate the transformation of sectoral sys-
tems towards decarbonisation, taking into account five key gover-
nance functions international institutions can perform (guidance
and signal, setting rules and standards, transparency and
accountability, means of implementation, knowledge and
learning). This set-up allows us to structure the amorphous climate
governance landscape and renders it susceptible to more detailed
analysis. It facilitates the identification of specific sectoral needs
and potentials, and the study of interdependencies, synergies and
trade-offs between the various elements of the landscape affecting
the sectoral systems in focus (Oberthür, Hermwille & Rayner, thisunder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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g.2021.100105
T. Rayner, S. Oberthür and L. Hermwille Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxissue). The added value of this approach has been tested and
demonstrated in five case studies on different sectoral systems,
covering power (Hermwille, this issue), energy-intensive industries
(Oberthür, Khandekar and Wyns, this issue), fossil fuel extractive
industries (Rayner, this issue, a), international transport (aviation
and shipping: Rayner, this issue, b), and land transport (Obergassel
et al., this issue). The framework was also applied to the cross-
cutting sectoral system of global finance which is not featured in
this Special Issue.1 A reference to these sectors in the following
implies a reference to the respective sectoral analyses included in
this special issue.
It is no surprise that our research shows an overall shortfall of
global climate governance across all cases. But our systematic
diagnosis allows us to distil six major findings of how and why the
potential of global climate governance remains underexploited.
First, sectoral systems are found to display varying economic,
technical, political and institutional barriers and challenges to
decarbonisation. Second, and consequently, sectoral systems have
specific needs and potentials for the five functions of international
governance institutions to contribute to effective climate protec-
tion, with wide variation. Third, the governance potential is un-
evenly exploited across both sectoral systems and governance
functions. Fourth, the sectoral analyses illustrate how the UNFCCC
and Paris Agreement, despite their important overarching role,
remain limited in advancing effective sectoral governance. Fifth, a
range of non-environmental institutions create or reinforce
important barriers to decarbonisation, but in some cases have a
more synergistic effect and potential. Sixth, our sectoral approach
provides a sound starting point for a systematic identification of
sector-specific policy options for advancing global climate gover-
nance, as outlined by contributors to this special issue. We then
offer reflections on the merits and limitations of the sectoral
approach, before identifying avenues for future research to further
advance this approach.2. Not all sectors are alike (I): sectoral transformation
challenges and barriers
The systematic analysis of the five sectoral systems has enabled
us to diagnose sector-specific transformation challenges and bar-
riers, and allowed us to pinpoint some commonalities but also
important differences between them. The findings are synthesized
in Table 1.
Economic barriers are important in all sectors but vary signifi-
cantly. For example, higher marginal costs of low-carbon technolo-
gies and practices are key in some sectors such as for energy-
intensive industries and international transport. As most energy-
intensive industries are highly exposed to international trade, the
cost of nationally legislated climate action could endanger their in-
ternational competitiveness. In other sectors, marginal costs of
mitigation options are lowover their lifetime but upfront investment
requirements are high and constitute a challenge (e.g. renewable
electricity in the power sector). This especially poses problems for
actors and countries with limited access to capital. Perceived risks
are also significantly holding back low-carbon investments across
sectoral systems. One further challenge for decarbonisation concerns
the manner in which the growth of activity in the transport-related
sectors (and their associated emissions) is strongly coupled histori-
cally with rising incomes and increased trade.1 This study of global finance and its relationship to the Paris Agreement (see
Kretschmer, 2021) revealed significant challenges in applying the sectoral frame-
work to cross-cutting sectoral systems whose boundaries cannot be clearly
delimited. The issue is further discussed in section 8 below.
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Similarly, political and institutional barriers are prominent in
all sectoral systems investigated, dominated as they are by large
incumbent corporations, whether privately or publicly owned.
These incumbents often fiercely protect their established business
models and wield significant political influence (at times with very
close association to governments, as is the case for nationally-
owned oil companies or legacy car manufacturers). Consequently,
appropriate regulatory frameworks are frequently lacking. In many
cases, existing institutions actually still promote high-emission
technologies and practices, having co-evolved with them over de-
cades. In addition, managing the distributional effects of climate
mitigation can present formidable challenges, particularly where
whole economic sectors and regions (such as areas entirely
depending on fossil fuel extractive industries) are at stake.
The significance of technological barriers varies across the
analysed sectoral systems. For some, they are not (any longer) a
major transformation challenge. For example, technical solutions
largely exist in power production and land-based transport, even if
technological challenges remain in specific areas (including system
integration and large-scale deployment). In contrast, technological
alternatives that enable a full decarbonisation of energy-intensive
industries and international transport (aviation in particular) are
yet to be fully developed and proven.
Awareness, information and capacity are key barriers in most
sectors. Awareness of problems, information about mitigation op-
tions and effective policies, and the technical skills of thework force
need to be improved across the board (with somewhat varying
prominence of these elements across sectoral systems). Investment
decisions across our sectoral systems continue to be guided in
many cases by short-termist expectations, while climate change
impacts will be felt most significantly in the long-term. This
dilemma was dubbed the ‘tragedy of the horizon’ by Mark Carney,
former Governor of the Bank of England (Carney 2015). Accord-
ingly, one of the core challenges is to provide the means and in-
formation for decision-making to better reflect the ‘social cost of
carbon’ and address the growing risks of a ‘carbon bubble’
(McGlade and Ekins 2015; Mercure et al., 2018).
3. Not all sectors are alike (II): varying potential of
international governance
As with the challenges and barriers, the potential for interna-
tional governance to address them varies across sectors. The sec-
toral approach allowed us systematically to assess the potential of
global governance per sector per governance function. The results
of the analysis are summarized in Table 2. In the following, we
discuss the specific potential of international governance to
contribute to sectoral decarbonisation for each of the five gover-
nance functions distinguished according to the case studies. Over-
all, we find that significant potential exists in all sectoral systems.
The rationale for providing clear guidance and signal towards
decarbonisation is common to all sectoral systems. The Paris
Agreement establishes the aim to phase out global net GHG emis-
sions in the second half of this century, which will have to be
reached as early as possible to maximise the chances of global
average temperature rise remaining below 2/1.5 C. It may not
necessarily be clear to key sectoral actors, however, what precisely
this means for them. For example, while big electricity producers
can conclude that the use of renewable energy needs to increase
dramatically and the (production and) use of unabated coal power
needs to end sooner rather than later (Yanguas-Parra et al., 2019),
the implications for gas-fired power generation are far less clear.
Utilizing fossil gas as a ‘bridge’ fuel may have short-term climate
benefits over coal-fired alternatives, but risks ‘locking in’ yet
another fossil fuel-based infrastructure (Tanaka et al., 2019;
Table 1
Overview of sector-specific transformation challenges and barriers.
Sectors Financial and Economic Institutional and Political Technological Awareness/Information/
Capacity
Power  High upfront RE investment costs
 Cost of re-building grid
infrastructure
 Blocking power of incumbents
 Appropriate market regulation/design
 Intermittency of wind/solar
 Storage solutions
 New grid infrastructure




 High capital requirements, long
investment cycles, and
technology risk
 Complexity of global value chains
 Fear of losing competitiveness/stunting
development
 Lack of policy frameworks
 Lack of mature low-carbon
technologies
 Technological inertia, insufficient
R&D spending





 ‘Resource curse’: unwillingness
by investors to invest in other
sectors
 Cost of transition for extraction-
reliant regions
 Risk of stranded assets
 Power of incumbents
 High fossil-fuel subsidies
 Distributional conflicts re. foregoing resource
rents and subsidies
 Lack of transparency on
fossil fuel subsidies (FFS).
 Lack of govt. capacity to
substitute FFS by more
targeted policies






 Very high infrastructure
expenditure required
 Higher upfront costs of new
vehicle technologies
 Growth in transport and
economic growth strongly
correlated
 Dominance of high-emission policy and
planning paradigms (e.g. segregated land-use,
priority for road-based transport)
 ’Road lobby’ influence (manufacturers,
hauliers, oil companies etc)
 Lack of technical standards for EVs
 Longevity of transport
infrastructure
 Need to adapt electricity grid to
cope with increasing loads and
shifts in demand profile
 Need for common standards for
charging solutions
 Need to adapt vehicle servicing
infrastructure
 ‘Car culture’
 Lack of capacity esp. in




 High cost of low-carbon alterna-
tive fuels relative to (untaxed)
aviation and shipping fuels
 Split incentives between ship
owners and hirers
 Growth in transport and
economic growth/trade strongly
correlated.
 Effort-sharing controversy e what is a fair
share?
 Power of incumbents
 Complexity of supply chain restructuring
needed for e.g. slow steaming
 Technical problems regarding
use of biofuels, hydrogen,
electricity
 Insufficient R&D spending/
coordination
 Lack of information on
mitigation potentials for
shippers
 Perceived individual ‘right
to fly’
 Low profile of shipping
lessens public pressure
Source: authors, based on sectoral case studies.
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further specified for particular regions, as suggested for energy-
intensive industries and transport) could generally make global
long-term goals more tangible for sectoral actors and more difficult
to ignore. This can be particularly helpful where sectors feature
many small and medium-sized actors with limited strategic capa-
bilities, as is the case for parts of the transport sector. In general, the
more concrete targets are, the more suitable they tend to be for
providing effective guidance to relevant sectoral actors.
The need for setting rules and standards to facilitate collective
action varies across the sectoral systems investigated. In some
sectors, international competition and/or interdependence provide
a strong and even compelling rationale for international regulation
that ensures a level-playing field (e.g. energy-intensive and fossil-
fuel extractive industries, including removal of fossil-fuel sub-
sidies; international aviation and shipping). In other cases, the
rationale for international rules and standards is much weaker. In
the power sector, for example, competitiveness concerns have lost
weight with the startling decline in the cost of renewable electricity
technologies in the 21st century. Still, international standardization
may facilitate the integration of electricity grids across national
borders on a regional scale. Furthermore, international regulation
could prompt action by governments which may not otherwise see
decarbonisation as a priority. In such cases, it may well need to be
accompanied by the provision of sufficient means of implementa-
tion. For example, emerging or developing economies may be
prompted to take steps to decarbonise certain sectors, provided
that international assistance is available.
Transparency and accountability are closely linked to the need
for international regulation and its underlying rationale since they3
specifically relate to the implementation of agreed rules and stan-
dards (see Oberthür, Hermwille and Rayner, this issue). A basic level
of transparency is also required to be able to adopt common rules
and standards in the first place. Once they have been agreed, the
demand for transparency and accountability is particularly pro-
nounced where international competition and interdependence
provide a strong motivation for free-riding, or where emissions
occur at multiple points in a lifecycle that extends beyond the
confines of a particular sector (as in low-carbon fuel production).
Hence, international transport and energy-intensive industries
feature a high demand for transparency and accountability to
support effective implementation of international regulation. In
contrast, there may be less need for specific arrangements, where
regulated activities are intrinsically relatively transparent (as with
fossil-fuel extractive industries) or where regulation is quasi self-
enforcing (e.g. technical standards for electric vehicles) (see also
Mitchell 1994).
The need for the provision of adequate means of implementa-
tion is generally high across the sectoral systems, but with signif-
icant variation across different means. Financial means of
implementation are in demand in most sectors, but in varying
forms. In energy-intensive industries, financial support may be
required for breakthrough technologies even in developed coun-
tries, while in other cases demand for financial transfers especially
exists in developing countries (transport). In some sectors, such as
extractive industries, key actors may themselves in principle
already dispose of sufficient financial resources to embark on
transitions. Meanwhile in the power sector, sustainable alternatives
might even be cost competitive over their lifetime but are impeded
by high upfront capital requirements. International cooperation
Table 2
Overview of sector-specific governance needs.
Sectors Guidance & Signal Rules & Standards Transparency &
Accountability
Means of implementation Knowledge & Learning





importance due to RE cost
fall)
 Coordination at regional
level (esp. grid
development)
 Required to support
collective action function
 financial risk sharing
 international transfer of RE and
storage technologies
 admin. and technological capacity
building
 sharing of good practice













 Required to monitor and
verify implementation of
rules
 Financing of breakthrough
technologies, technology transfer
and R&D coordination




 Signal phase out of
fossil fuel extraction











 Rules on FFS phase-out






 Technical and financial support
for national reform efforts
(transition away from extractive
industry, FFS reform efforts)
 Raise awareness of carbon
bubble/stranded asset risk













 Regulation, e.g. emissions
control, carbon pricing,
climate budget reform
 Needed for emission limits
and carbon pricing
 Financial risk-sharing for large
infrastructure projects





gies and policy design
International
transport
 Global limits and phase-
out of (net) emissions
(with differentiation)
 Define net zero










 To ensure effective
implementation of
international rules (and
allow appropriate rules to
be set)
 Full lifecycle accounting
 Technical cooperation/technology
transfer (shipping)
 Access to capital/finance, e.g. for
retrofits (shipping)
 Finance/subsidy of R&D
 Institutional capacity building
 (Joint) R&D for low-
carbon technologies/fuels




including on policy co-
benefits
Source: authors, based on sectoral case studies.
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with unfavourable investment conditions. International coopera-
tion on technology and innovation/technology transfer may be
particularly warranted in sectors in need of new technologies for
the climate transition (energy-intensive industries, transport, in-
ternational aviation). Phasing out old unsustainable technologies
and practices in as just a way as possible has been identified as a
major challenge in most sectors, but the fossil fuel extractives
sectoral system is unique in that, ultimately, the whole industry
needs effectively to be phased out. In all likelihood, corresponding
structural adjustments in the host countries/regions will require
technical and financial support also at the international level.
Finally, there is strong demand for capacity building across all
sectoral systems, but this is highly specific and diverse in nature
(e.g. incorporating technical skills, policymaking capacity, infra-
structure to implement policy instruments, etc.).
The need for international cooperation for knowledge and
learning also significantly varies across sectoral systems. In some
sectoral systems, there is a particular need for awareness raising
and knowledge creation. For example, awareness and knowledge of
the risks of investments in “unburnable carbon”, stranded assets
and related financial risks are still low in the extractive industry
sectoral system. Similarly, understanding of the interdependencies
of global supply and value chains of energy-intensive industries as
well as technological solutions for the decarbonisation of interna-
tional aviation remain lacking. For some sectors, technology
development, demonstration and research coordination seem key
(international transport, energy-intensive industries). In most
sectors, there is a considerable potential for promoting technical4
and/or policy learning across countries and jurisdictions. In some
cases, specific demand for the creation of particular information or
data exists (extractive industries, international transport).
Overall, the sectoral approach thereby also illustrates and re-
flects the diversity of the potential of international institutions to
respond to varying challenges. In so doing, it aligns with critiques of
the tendency to view the dilemmas of international climate policy
exclusively through the lens of the collective action paradigm
(Aklin and Mildenberger, 2020; Hale, 2020), especially concerning
rule setting and related transparency and accountability. Our
analysis demonstrates that collective action problems do play a role
in certain sectoral systems (or components thereof), and that their
relevance depends on sectoral characteristics as they evolve over
time (see Table 2). In contrast, other sectoral systems are charac-
terised by different problem structures and hence needs and po-
tentials for international governance.
4. Specifying the gaps in international governance
Our systematic assessment reveals the diversity, shape and
composition of the climate governance landscape across sectoral
systems (see Fig. 1). In power and land-based transport, a plethora
of sector-specific and more overarching institutions e both inter-
governmental and transnational e contribute to climate gover-
nance, with no clear hierarchy among them. The other sectoral
governance landscapes feature far fewer institutions, in particular
far fewer transnational ones. In this respect, governance of inter-
national aviation and shipping is more centralized, with ICAO and
IMO assigned the lead, respectively. Such a centre of authority and
Fig. 1. Overview of international institutions governing selected sectoral systems.
Source: Derived from case studies.
T. Rayner, S. Oberthür and L. Hermwille Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxpolicy-making seems absent in the governance of extractive in-
dustries and energy-intensive industries. Very few international
institutions address specifically energy-intensive industries. Fig. 1
provides an overview of the institutional landscape relating to
the sectors covered in this special issue.
Regardless of their varying institutional density, a significant
potential for international governance remains untapped in all
sectoral systems. In the power sector, where governance of
decarbonisation has arguably progressed furthest and the guidance
and signal is strong and clear for the phase-in of renewable energy
(and where there may even be an oversupply on transparency and
accountability), guidance on the need to phase out fossil fuel-
powered electricity generation has remained vague (for coal) or
virtually absent (for oil and gas). Governance of the phase-out of
fossil-fuel extractive industries has remained wanting across all5
functions. Although fossil-fuel subsidy reform has made some
headway, its potential to reduce emissions has yet to be mean-
ingfully exploited, due to the difficulty of agreeing specific rules. For
energy-intensive industries, the pattern is the same, with a
particularly lamentable undersupply of rules and standards. In
land-based transport, global climate governance does little to
challenge dominant high-emission policy and planning paradigms
and to shift public resources to sustainable modes, and lacks rules
on sector-specific targets and strategies. International transport,
where opportunities to better internalise external costs exist, has
yet to exploit the promise of market-based instruments or other
effective measures such as relatively ‘low-hanging’ operational
measures to control speed in shipping. The shortcomings of inter-
national governance of global finance for climate purposes
(Kretschmer 2021) presents problems across sectoral systems.
2 The “Koronivia joint work on agriculture” mandated by COP decision 4/CP.23 is
a rare exemption of sectorally focused technical work under the UNFCCC, with its
exact outcome yet unclear at the time of writing.
T. Rayner, S. Oberthür and L. Hermwille Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxPhasing out support for ‘brown’ investments constitutes a tougher
challenge than raising funds for investments in low-carbon
alternatives.
The (average) supply of the different governance functions also
varies significantly. The means of implementation and knowledge
and learning functions are the best provided for. This may reflect
the relatively lowcosts of advancing the latter, and the possibility to
build on an existing institutional infrastructure in the case of the
former (including the financial and technology mechanisms of the
UNFCCC, multilateral development banks, and others). Having said
that, there remains uncertainty over exact sums being dedicated to
R&D in some critical cases (such as energy-intensive industries and
aviation). While the Paris Agreement has delivered important
general guidance and signal, sectoral specification remains lacking
in most cases. International governance has, however, been most
deficient in supplying adequate rule-setting (and related trans-
parency). This may not be surprising since agreement on such
regulation is hard to achieve given its potentially far-reaching
distributional consequences and opposition from incumbents.
Consequently, where international regulation has advanced, its
substance has often remained inadequate, as for example in regu-
lation for the decarbonisation of international transport.
Overall, despite significant governance activities in most secto-
ral systems, crucial gaps remain. Key governance potentials remain
underexploited, especially with respect to hard-to-achieve regu-
lation. A rising number of transnational governance institutions has
contributed to global climate governance but has not been able to
fill the gaps. This seems to confirm previous research that has
pointed out that polycentric governance systems are not neces-
sarily self-organising so as to provide critical governance functions
(Jordan et al., 2018). Our approach has enabled us to systematically
identify the existing key gaps and potentials.
5. The UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement: important but not
sufficient
The UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement address all five governance
functions for climate policy in its broadest sense, and feature in
important respects (though to varying degrees) across all sectoral
systems examined in this special issue. Yet, its contribution to the
identified governance needs varies per function. Perhaps its most
salient and also important contribution consists of the overarching
guidance and signal it offers. Its key message e that deep decar-
bonisation is required for reaching long-term temperature goals (cf.
Hermwille et al., 2017) e resonates to some extent in all sectors.
Particularly ground-breaking but often overlooked, its Article 2.1(c)
directs all financial flows to become consistent with the Agree-
ment’s mitigation and adaptation objectives. This has initiated a
paradigm shift in recognising and highlighting the key role of the
global financial system, traditionally seen as a “neutral” interme-
diary, in bringing about the global climate transition (also see
Chenet et al., 2019; Kretschmer 2021).
However, our sectoral assessment has highlighted the need for
more specific guidance which the Paris Agreement does not
currently provide. As mentioned in section 3 above, the implica-
tions of the Agreement’s long-term goals for coal (and renewables)
are relatively straightforward but less clear for oil and, especially,
gas. Similarly, energy-intensive industries, land transport (for
which the UN Habitat New Urban Agenda and the SDGs may prove
more impactful) and international transport receive no specific
guidance. The Agreement’s aforementioned finance goal is also in
need of further interpretation and specification to give clear guid-
ance to the financial system (see Kretschmer, 2021).
The enhanced transparency framework established under
Article 13 will likely further improve transparency and6
accountability as well as knowledge and learning in a range of
sectors, but mainly at the aggregate level. Parties to the Paris
Agreement are mandated to report transparently and compre-
hensively on their emissions but not on other key indicators that
may reflect more directly the progress of sectoral transformation
(e.g. emission per passenger km travelled or share of renewable/
zero emission energy) (see Jeffery et al., 2019). Also, the established
territorial approach to accounting for emissions does not recognize
or reward actions which might lead to emission reductions
‘offshore’ (such as restricting fossil fuel exports).
While the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement make important
contributions to securing adequate means of implementation,
these need to be complemented. The Green Climate Fund and other
funds under the UNFCCC constitute important channels and means
(see Kretschmer 2021), as does the Technology Mechanism (Wyns
et al. 2019). Capacity building is also advanced (Khan et al., 2016).
However, the sectoral analyses provide clear evidence that, even if
means of implementation under the UN regime were adequately
strengthened, further action beyond will be required (e.g. involving
Multilateral Development Banks and private banking for the
financial system).
As far as sectorally specific rules and standards to facilitate
collective action are concerned, the Paris Agreement’s relevance is
severely limited. The Agreement contains few mandatory legal
requirements on Parties; those it sets out primarily relate to the
submission of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and
reporting obligations (Oberthür and Bodle, 2016). In addition, the
5-yearly cycle of taking stock of collective progress and commu-
nicating new and updated NDCs stimulates and offers opportu-
nities to synchronise climate policy processes on the national and
international level (Obergassel et al., 2016). However, overall the
Paris Agreement and the wider UNFCCC have done very little that
would meet the sectoral needs and potentials identified in our
sectoral analyses (see Table 2).
Given its primary focus on GHG emissions in general and the
historically relatively minor role of sector-specific perspectives,2
the limited contribution of the UNFCCC to sectoral governance is
not altogether surprising. The Paris Agreement hardly makes
reference to specific sectors and its long-term goals remain
generally detached from sectoral systems. Nevertheless, these goals
provide important general guidance, including for the elaboration
of more sector-specific guidance possibly by more sectorally
focused institutions. Similarly, the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement
make important contributions to transparency and providing
means of implementation, which need to be complemented by
more sector-specific arrangements.6. The ambivalent role of non-environmental institutions
Non-environmental/climate related institutions played impor-
tant but ambivalent roles in most, if not all, sectoral systems ana-
lysed. Frequently pre-dating the UN climate regime, these
institutions’ policies and activities have, on the one hand, at times
impeded decarbonisation efforts and have generally so far not been
particularly well aligned with the decarbonisation imperative. On
the other hand, they possess important sectoral authority that
might in principle be employed to advance decarbonisation.
Overall, the contributions to this special issue confirm the need for
a further mainstreaming of climate objectives into non-
environmental institutions.
3 This is particularly true for the Energy Charter Treaty. Its investor-state dispute
settlement provisions enable corporations to sue governments for ‘loss of future
profits’ (Eberhardt et al., 2018).
T. Rayner, S. Oberthür and L. Hermwille Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxThe World Trade Organization (WTO) was found to have sig-
nificance for several sectoral systems, with ambivalent implica-
tions. On the one hand, WTO disciplines have continued to inhibit
the implementation of border carbon adjustment mechanisms to
address competitiveness and carbon-leakage concerns of energy-
intensive industries arising from effective national climate pol-
icies e even if there may be ways of designing WTO-compatible
measures (Mehling et al., 2019). Moreover, WTO-related argu-
ments have been employed to hinder the development of market-
based measures to address GHG emissions from international
shipping (even if apparently wrongly so) (Chircop et al., 2018).
Similarly, investment treaties, and specifically their investor-state
dispute settlement provisions, have raised concerns of chilling
the development and implementation of ambitious climate policies
(see extractive industry analysis). On the other hand, the WTO
system allows preferential trade agreements that could facilitate
the deployment of renewable energy and other low-carbon tech-
nologies (Hermwille, this issue; Morin and Jinnah, 2018). Further-
more, negotiations on a so-called Environmental Goods Agreement
launched in 2014 could serve to reduce tariffs and trade barriers on
low-carbon technologies (Van de Graaf and Colgan, 2016). And the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures has a
high potential to support the phase-out of fossil-fuel subsidies,
even if countries’ obligations under the agreement may need to be
clarified to this end (Casier et al., 2014).
The role of ICAO and IMO for the decarbonisation of interna-
tional aviation and shipping, respectively, is similarly ambivalent.
ICAO’s Chicago Convention, in force since 1947, primarily aims to
facilitate the expansion of global civil aviation and related decisions
have exempted fuel for international flights from taxation, as
enshrined in a large number of bilateral aviation agreements. At the
same time, it has the authority to regulate international aviation
and has started to address the sector’s GHG emissions, in particular
by elaborating the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for
International Aviation (CORSIA). IMO, for its part, aims to develop
and regulate international shipping and has started to address its
GHG emissions as well, although further concrete measures remain
to be elaborated and implemented. To date, action within both
international organisations has been insufficient for effectively
advancing international transport’s climate transition.
Much the same can be said of relevant international financial
institutions, including the World Bank and other Multilateral
Development Banks (MDBs). The means available to them to help
bring about the global shift to low-carbon investments is enormous
and they have made appreciable progress towards adapting their
policies accordingly. However, additional, more resolute changes
are required so that funding for low-carbon investments is suffi-
ciently increased and support for carbon-intensive investments (in
fossil-fuel extraction and consumption, e.g. in energy-intensive
industries) is ended. Other international institutions, such as
UNIDO in the case of energy-intensive industries, face very similar
challenges.
The role of other institutions is similarly ambivalent. The G7 and
G20 primarily focus on other issues, including some that may be at
odds with the climate transition (e.g. economic growth, trade).
However, they also conduct work that has potential to advance that
transition (fossil fuel subsidies, climate discussions among major
emitters, G20 Financial Stability Board). Yet, progress on advancing
decarbonisation has remained very limited, as is evident from the
lack of progress on the phase out of fossil fuel subsidies to which
the G20 committed in 2009. Similarly, the IEA has the potential to
play a central role for the power sector but also for energy-intensive
and extractive industries. The IEA already serves as a central in-
formation hub and has considerable convening power. Yet, its
legacy as an oil buyers’ club and its membership limitations (only7
OECD members can become full members) still impede its taking
on a more transformative role (see power sector analysis).
Overall, there remains a considerable scope, and need, to align
non-environmental institutions towards the climate transition.
None of them seems to be directly opposed to effective climate
policies, but varying levels of tensionwith their core objectives and
routines can be observed.3 Pressure arising from (the threat of)
unilateral action has been helpful in initiating change in the case of
international transport. For the climate transition to advance/suc-
ceed, the challengemore generally is tomore fully integrate climate
objectives into the policies and routines of these non-
environmental institutions so as to direct their authority towards
the decarbonisation goal.7. Options to enhance international climate governance
The sectoral approach advanced in this special issue has served
to yield a solid overview of the institutional landscape for each
sectoral system and to systematically identify related governance
gaps. This also provides a basis for further deliberations on how the
identified gaps and weaknesses might be addressed. Accordingly,
the sectoral analyses briefly address options for improvement,
focusing onwhether: (1) the scope of existing institutions might be
expanded, or their focus shifted for this purpose; (2) the creation of
new institutions might be warranted; and (3) the coordination of
existing institutions holds promise. These options are not mutually
exclusive, but may be complementary. While this discussion of
policy options only constitutes a beginning, it provides a useful
starting point for a more encompassing future assessment (see
section 9 on future research below).
The UNFCCC has some (limited) potential for advancing gover-
nance in several sectoral systems, especially extractive industries
(and beyond the articles in this special issue, global finance - see
Kretschmer 2021). Untapped potential to tackle the neglected
‘supply side’ of climate policy (Lazarus and van Asselt 2018) and
facilitate economic diversification away from fossil-fuels extractive
industries could be exploited, including through the UNFCCC’s
forum on response measures, the Green Climate Fund and the
Global Environment Facility. Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement,
aligning all financial flows with the objectives of the agreement,
still needs to be translated into meaningful sectoral terms and re-
quires additional guidelines on how to track all domestic and in-
ternational finance flows in relation to the 1.5 C target. This should
have a significant effect on all sectoral systems covered in this
special issue. Especially the analyses of land transport, power, and
finance furthermore suggest that the UNFCCC might help motivate
and coordinate sectoral targets towards the Paris Agreement’s
long-term temperature and emission goals. In this context, the
UNFCCC could endorse sectoral visions developed in other inter-
national forums, thereby raising their profile. These suggestions
seem compatible with a conceptualisation of the multilateral
regime as an overarching framework, with potential to further
orchestrate polycentric global climate governance (see also
Hermwille et al., 2017), in need of sectoral specification and
supplementing.
Other overarching institutions also have further potential. The
analyses of the finance and fossil-fuels extractives sectoral systems
highlight that the G7 and the G20 (working with theWTO) could in
principle serve to tighten commitments to phasing out fossil-fuel
use and fossil-fuel subsidies, and hasten implementation. The
T. Rayner, S. Oberthür and L. Hermwille Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxG20 was also highlighted as a critical forum for efforts to manage
the risks to the global economy presented by the ‘carbon bubble’.
While both the UNFCCC and the G20 may have a role to play in this
respect, each would need significant upgrading to take on a leading
role. Furthermore, adjustments to the mandates and policies of the
World Bank and other Multilateral Development Banks are worth
considering in a number of sectoral systems, including energy-
intensive industries and international shipping, so as to direct
finance and investment towards the climate transition.
For several sectoral systems, our analyses identify a significant
potential for advancing governance through existing sector-oriented
institutions. In addition to the international financial institutions
discussed above, a reformed IEA could elaborate more detailed
roadmaps, and advance global agreements to phase out fossil fuel
use e but the far-reaching reforms required to this end, including a
break with the OECD, may call feasibility into question. For energy-
intensive industries, very few initiatives exist that could be
enhanced. In international transport, ICAO and IMO have latterly
begun providing a degree of leadership on climate governance for
aviation and shipping, respectively e but have been limited by the
continuing hold over key decision-making processes exercised by
incumbent actors. Pending more radical institutional restructuring
of these bodies (which remains some way off), there is a case for
encouraging regionally-based regulatory initiatives, such as the
EU’s. By facilitating decarbonisation, such initiatives could even-
tually also generate greater ambition at the global level.
Despite calls for “institutional economy”, the creation of new
institutions may be contemplated where suitable existing in-
stitutions are not available, or where required reforms of existing
institutions seem too far-reaching in view of their current objec-
tives and design (on the case of IRENA, see Van de Graaf, 2013).
Proponents of new institutions should beware, however, of
endemic obstacles to progress re-appearing within new institu-
tional arrangements, if their establishment is even deemed
acceptable to veto players (Michonski and Levy, 2010). The analyses
of international transport and fossil-fuel extractive industries, for
example, highlight the lobbying power of incumbent, fossil-fuel
reliant industry actors (see also Harich, 2010). In the case of
energy-intensive industries, the establishment of one or several
new, sectoral institutions with participation of governments and
key industry players may be considered, in the form of one over-
arching institution and/or sub-sector specific initiatives (possibly
including transnational sectoral decarbonisation clubs: Obergassel
et al., 2019; Hermwille, 2019). In the case of fossil-fuel extractives, a
‘non-proliferation treaty’ has been proposed (Newell and Simms,
2019), but its prospects of getting off the ground in the face of
dominant political-economic forces currently look uncertain, at
best.
As a third type of response, coordination and orchestration of
existing institutions features as a prominent option especially
where institutional density is relatively high. Hence, the sheer
number of institutions involved in the governance of the power and
transport sectors (land-based and international maritime), espe-
cially focused on capacity building and knowledge and learning,
suggests a considerable potential for coordination to avoid dupli-
cation of effort and increase performance. In addition, potential for
enhanced orchestration led by the G20 has been identified in the
case of fossil-fuel extractive industries, with MDBs and other do-
nors providing targeted support for the transition away from these
industries. Overall, the UNFCCC, as the overarching umbrella of
international climate governance, may be suitable for coordinating
sectoral initiatives to some extent, including in the field of climate
finance populated by the Green Climate Fund, MDBs, Mission
Innovation and others. The analysis of international shipping
furthermore highlights a need to pay attention to coordination of8
activities across levels of governance (and hence beyond a sole
focus on international governance e see also the discussion on
future research below).
Which approach and mixture of the above is most promising
will ultimately depend on the pre-existing institutional landscape
and other sectoral characteristics. Undertaken in a sectorally-
specific way, governance needs to overcome particular barriers,
address widely varying numbers of relevant actors, etc., weighing
the efficiency benefits of retaining existing institutions against the
need to break more definitively with established, unsustainable
practices.
8. Merits and limitations of the sectoral approach
This special issue has demonstrated the usefulness of a sectoral
approach to international climate governance. Digging deep into
socio-technical sectoral systems has brought to the fore important
transformation challenges that can and should be addressed by
international governance. That global climate governance has fallen
short of facilitating a global transformation towards meeting the
climate objectives of the Paris Agreement is no surprise. Yet,
combining a sectoral perspective with the identified governance
functions provides a useful structure for a more detailed and sys-
tematic diagnosis of precisely why it has fallen short, and in which
respects. Systematic assessment of sectoral systems draws partic-
ular attention to what is required by actors ‘on the ground’, and has
enabled us to highlight specific governance gaps and think about
options to further enhance international governance.
Yet, there are also inherent limitations with our approach. As
noted in our introductory paper (Oberthür, Hermwille and Rayner,
this issue), the question of what constitutes a sectoral system, and
how this differs from sectors as defined in other contexts, is not one
that can be definitively resolved, once and for all. Delimiting
satisfactory boundaries of analysis is likely to be particularly chal-
lenging in certain cases. For example, defining the boundaries of
the global financial systemmay face particular difficulties due to its
amorphous structure, involving a set of actors ranging widely from
public development and climate finance institutions, multilateral,
national and corporate banks and insurance companies, through to
hedge funds and other financial service providers. Moreover, there
are deep rooted interdependencies between the financial and other
sectoral systems. Nevertheless, the (emerging) institutional sub-
complex on governing global finance is obviously critical to the
climate transition (Kretschmer 2021).
More importantly, beyond financial aspects, a focus on sectoral
systems may not naturally highlight significant overlaps and in-
terdependencies between these systems. All the sectoral systems
analysed in this special issue experience interdependencies, such as
between the power sector on the one hand and energy-intensive
industries and transport on the other, given trends towards electri-
fication. These interdependencies may have positive or negative im-
plications. In negative terms, competition to secure feedstocks for
biofuels, to purchase carbon market credits (as in the case of inter-
national transport), or reliance on the prospect of negative emission
technologies (for ‘hard-to-abate’ sectors in general) establish links
across sectoral systems that may compromise the deliverability of
sectoral decarbonisation targets. In more positive terms, action by a
sector such as shipping to develop hydrogen-based solutions at scale
can draw in a range of other sectors, able to exploit the economies of
scale achieved to deploy such solutions more widely. Although we
have explicitly paid attention to such interactions and in-
terdependencies, we must admit that the sectoral approach may not
be the most pertinent tool for investigating cross-sectoral implica-
tions, including the related need for coordination to foster coherence
across polycentric governance systems (see also Jordan et al., 2018).
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functions. Their use implies a level of aggregation that may hide
important specifics within each. For example, means of imple-
mentation include three important and different general compo-
nents, namely technology, finance, and capacity building. Similarly,
knowledge and learning encompasses data gathering and science,
technology development, knowledge about effective policy design
and awareness raising. This makes it difficult to provide an overall,
aggregate assessment of the fulfilment of these governance func-
tions, but it is also in danger of glossing over important aspects. In
response, we have attempted to pay due attention to all the sub-
components of the governance functions in our analyses and to
make any judgements involved in weighing them explicit. Our
analyses have provided evidence that, ultimately, more granularity
is required in the exploration and assessment of the five gover-
nance functions than may be suggested by their headlines.
Our analysis has also prompted some reflection on interlinkages
between the governance functions. For example, the extractive
industry sectoral analysis highlights the importance of a level of
knowledge and learning as a precondition for further progress on
delivering guidance and signal and rule-setting. The relationship
between transparency and accountability, rule-setting, and knowl-
edge and learning was found to be subtly nuanced. In the case of
international transport, data about industry performance,
including emissions, were a pre-requisite for effective rule-setting.
Thereafter, continued and refined data gathering would also serve
to support transparency and accountability. The same broad point
stands for global finance (Kretschmer 2021). In more general terms,
knowledge and learning and transparency and accountability espe-
cially were found to be closely related in many sectoral systems,
since they may rely on the same data and information (that may
hence serve a double-function).
Mitigating climate change faces very varied challenges and op-
portunities in different sectoral systems. Overall, systematically
analysing governance needs, supply and gaps in specific sectoral
systems with respect to five general governance functions has
allowed the identification of both weaknesses and opportunities in
the international governance landscape that either escape notice,
or are under-emphasised, in other analyses and approaches.
Despite its limitations, we think that this special issue has
demonstrated that the proposed sectoral approach can make an
important contribution to arriving at a more systematic analysis of
the adequacy of global climate governance for the considered
sectoral systems as well as at the overall level.
9. Directions for future research
While we are confident that this special issue has provided
evidence for the added value of a sectoral approach to global
climate governance, we recognize that this is but a first attempt at
its development and application. A wealth of possible avenues for
future research suggest themselves, to further deepen and expand
the approach. Without trying to be exhaustive, we highlight four
areas for such future research that appear particularly promising to
us.
First, there is enormous potential to further investigate the
politics of sectoral climate governance. In this special issue, we have
focused on investigating barriers and challenges to decarbonisation
per sectoral system, the current contribution of governance in-
stitutions to addressing these, and the general scope for enhancing
this contribution. We were not able to explore as fully as we would
have liked the political interests and struggles which underly the
inadequacy of current governance provisions, and presumably
shape and constrain any attempts at improvement. More explicitly
exploring the role of agency and power would enable a more9
detailed understanding of the political barriers to effective gover-
nance and the reasons for current deficiencies. Part of this inves-
tigation of the politics of sectoral governance could and should be
the systematic exploration of equity aspects (“just transition”,
“climate justice”) important for ensuring broad societal and inter-
national support, without which the climate transition is likely to
falter (as highlighted in our analyses covering the extractive in-
dustries and power sectoral systems).
Second, and following from the first point, there is considerable
scope to clarify further options for institutional reform, be it by
developing existing institutions or creating new ones, to enhance
sectoral climate governance. Our analysis has only been able to
identify some general options to address sector-specific barriers to
decarbonisation, taking into account the broad potential of existing
institutions (in view of their composition, objectives and capacities).
The aforementioned exploration of underlying politics could provide
a basis for investigating further the feasibility of institutional options
and strategies for their realisation, taking into account political
economy-related constraints. Other factors shaping and constraining
attempts at institutional reform may also deserve systematic atten-
tion, including existing institutions’ rationales, path dependencies,
established practices and constituencies (Voß and Simons, 2014);
inter-institutional interdependencies; and deeply engrained growth-
oriented economic paradigms and societal practices (Hickel and
Kallis, 2019). In addition, questions of institutional design remain to
be clarified in much more detail; there is a need to systematically
elaborate and compare institutional options to minimize identified
gaps and more fully exploit governance potentials.
Third, significant promise lies in developing the sectoral
approach from a more multi-level, fully polycentric governance
perspective. In this special issue, we have focused on global climate
governance through intergovernmental and transnational in-
stitutions. However, this is but one level of governance, accompa-
nied by governance at regional (e.g. European), national and
subnational levels. Following Roger et al. (2017), activities at other
levels contribute significantly to the supply of governance func-
tions. For example, knowledge and learning may be advanced at
various levels, and the combined actions of a larger number of
actors at lower levels of governance may provide an effective signal
in itself. In our sectoral analyses, the significance of activity across
different governance levels came into focus in the international
shipping case and in land transport, for example. However, much
more needs to be done to investigate what different governance
levels could contribute and how each could usefully complement
and re-enforce the others, possibly balancing out respective
weaknesses. Considerable potential also remains to develop a
geographically and regionally more differentiated understanding of
sectoral climate governance; specifically, are some regions of the
globe leading in terms of responding to sectoral climate challenges,
while others lag?
Recent scholarship on polycentricity in climate governance has
called for more attention to the development of climate governance
responses over time; whether, for example, trust and mutual
adjustment can occur among actors without top-down direction,
and various transnational initiatives endure (Jordan et al., 2018).
These are certainly germane questions in taking forward sectoral
systems-oriented research. Similarly, we might ask to what extent
governance arrangements in one sectoral system take into account
the behaviour of other systems, and are able to engage in mutual
adjustment across sectors, for example to coordinate the use of
offsetting or allocate scarce biofuel resources to those with the
most valid claim (a possibility so far not examined by polycentric
analyses as far as we know).
Fourth, a sectoral approach to international climate governance
also provides a new lens for assessing the performance of
T. Rayner, S. Oberthür and L. Hermwille Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxindividual actors and especially their international leadership. For
example, the European Union (EU) has long claimed and pursued
international leadership on climate change. Related analyses have
to date tended to focus on the role of the EU in the multilateral
UNFCCC regime (e.g., B€ackstrand and Elgstr€om, 2013; Parker et al.,
2017; Oberthür and Groen, 2018). Our sectoral approach draws
attention to the efforts of such actors across the wider, multi-
institutional governance landscape, differentiated by sectoral sys-
tem. It thereby provides a more comprehensive benchmark, and a
basis for a more fine-grained, systematic assessment, of interna-
tional climate leadership.
Overall, the sectoral approach to international climate gover-
nance hence opens up a rich and fascinating agenda for future
research. We trust that this special issue has been able to demon-
strate the added value and potential of this sectoral approach to
advance our understanding of multi-institutional polycentric
climate governance. We are confident that there is scope for mak-
ing use of and developing the approach beyond the areas high-
lighted above, and that advancing the sectoral approach, with its
focus on specific barriers and sectoral conditions, also has the po-
tential to help improve global and multi-level polycentric climate
governance in practice.
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